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IN THE SUPREI\tm COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG CALDWELL and ROBERT 
E. COVINGTON,dba CALD-WELL ... 
AND COVINGTON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants~ 
vs. 
ANSCHUTZ DRILLING COM-
PANY, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. JlJNl {i; ·~ : j.' J. ', 
'-AvV Ltb~~-.l:.· 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court for Uintah County, 
Hon. Joseph E. Nelson, Judge 
F. ROBERT BAYLE and 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR OF 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Young, Thatcher & Glasmann 
1018 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 
John C. Beaslin 
Vernal, Utah 
Holme, Roberts, More & Owen 
1700 Broadway 
Denver 2, Colorado 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Page 
0 pening S ta temen t _______ .... __ . _ ... __ .. _ ..... _ ............. __ -··-----·· 1 
~~r~ument ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I 
Point !-Appellants were not required to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence a case for specific 
performance nor was specific performance a proper 
issue to be determined on appeal based upon the 
present state of the trial record. -------------------------------- I 
Point 2-The Respondents, having made an offer 
to the appellants, which offer was accepted, were 
not permitted to orally extend the time for payment 
of the earnest money, and then, when it was too late 
to conform to the terms of the original contract, 
refuse to abide by the ter1ns of the oral time exten-
sion. ----------------------···------------------------------------------------------- iJ 
Point il-There is ample evidence to support this 
court's finding that there was an offer to sign and 
deliver the contract by appellant's agent. _________________ _ 
Point 4-There was ample evidence on which a 
finding could be based that the appellants offered to 
sign the written contract and pay the earnest money 
but their tender was refused. --------------------------------------
Point 5-There was an offer to tender cash to the 
Respondent which was refused by their Petitioner ... 
Conclusion 
CASES CITED 





II Pac 512 ----------------------···----------------------------------- 8 
Cummings Y. Nielson, -:t2 Utah 157, I29 Pac 6I9.. 8 
In re McKnight, 4 Utah 2il7, 9 Pac 299 --·--···------------ 8 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
l,lt~\1(~ l,ALD,VELL and ROBERT 
E.l~O,TINGTON,dba CALDWELL 
AND COVING'fON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants~ 
vs. 
ANSCHUTZ DitiLLING COM-
l>ANY, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Resp_ondent. 
No. 
9587 
APPELLANTS' BRIEf4' IN ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING .AND SUPPORTING BRmF 
The appellants, having heretofore set forth the 
facts in their brief on appeal, will confine this brief to 
ans,vering the points raised by respondent's petition for 
rehearing. 
POINT I 
.l\.PPELLANTS WERE NOT REQUIRED 
TO PRO,TE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
E'TIDEXCE A CASE FOR SPECIFIC PER-
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FORMANCE NOR 'VAS SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE A PROPER ISSUE TO BE DE-
TERMINED ON APPEAL BASED UPON 
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE TRIAL 
RECORD. 
This Court's opinion of April 3, 1962, and the 
determination of issues therein, aptly and adequately 
disposes of all material issues raised on appeal. The 
petitioner raises issues not supported by the trial record, 
in its present state, and has not made a showing that 
a material issue remains unresolved. 'l"he respondent 
suggests in its brief that this Court has failed to rule 
upon the issue of specific performance. It is respect-
fully submitted that until the issues of fact have been 
determined by a jury, the question of specific perform-
ance is not material. Certainly counsel for petitioner 
must be aware of the time-honored rule of law that 
land and interest therein, being unique, are the proper 
subject of specific performance. 
Without submitting repetitious argument and 
authorities, it is respectfully suggested that this Hon-
orable Court correctly refused to further burden 
itself with issues immaterial to a proper determination 
of the case. Petitioner further claims at page 2 of its 
brief, that this Court should have applied the rule re-
quiring "clear and convincing" proof by the appellants. 
The cases referred to by petitioner at pages 21 and 22 
of its Brief on Appeal clearly indicate that the facts 
are in no way similar to those in the instant case. Peti-
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tioner has cited cases wherein it was alleged that an 
"oral contract" existed for the conveyance of real 
property. In the instant case, it is clear by the contract 
received in evidence that the parties' agreement was 
reduced to \vri ting and in fact signed by the petitioner. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENTS, HAVING MADE 
r\N 0~-,:F'ER '1"'0 TilE APPELLANTS, WHICH 
OFFER WAS A.CCEPTED, 'VERE NOT PER-
l\IITTED TO ORALLY EXTEND THE TIME 
FOR PAYMENT OF 'THE EARNEST MONEY, 
AND THEN, 'iVHEN IT WAS TOO LA'l,E TO 
CONFORM TO 'l,HE 'TERMS OF THE ORIGI-
NAL C.ONTRAC'f, REFUSE '1'0 ABIDE BY 
THE TER~IS OF 'THE ORAL TIME EX TEN-
SION. 
The contract offer and price had been in fact ac-
cepted by the appellants and there remained only the 
matter of payment. Petitioner continues to treat the 
facts of the case as ii1dicating a n1ere offer that had 
never been accepted. The facts, as presented, by the 
appellants, clearly show that there was a contract re-
duced to writing and in fact accepted. 
The affidavit of ''T· ,V. "\tVakefield, a 'rice-Presi-
dent of the Petitioner, clearly shows that at no time 
did the Petitioner withdraw its offer to the appellants 
until after it had refused to accept the appellants' 
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tender of payment. See paragraph 2 of Mr. Wakefield's 
affidavit on file herein wherein he stated: "Mr. H. 0. 
Lynch, President of Anschutz Drilling Company, Inc., 
instructed me to accept Mr. Alloway's personal check 
if it were certified. Mr. Lynch then left the office." 
'fhis affidavit, filed by the Petitioner in support 
of its motion for summary judgment, clearly shows 
that its offer had been accepted and the time for pay-
ment was the only matter in dispute. See also the 
affidavit filed by Dennis R. Drake, an ·employee of 
the Petitioner, "\\'"herein he states, in paragraph 2: "On 
·February 16, 1961, 1\tlr. Craig Caldwell, one of the 
plaintiffs in this matter, telephoned and spoke to me 
and Mr. H. 0. Lynch, President of Anschutz Drilling 
Company, Inc.; Mr. Caldwell stated that he would 
purchase the subject acreage of this action at the price 
of $1.25 per acre. Mr. Caldwell agreed to put up one 
quarter of the total purchase price as earnest money. He 
stated that Anschutz Drilling Company_, Inc., draw up 
a contract and 1nail it to hi'm.-'-' (Italics ours). 
See also the affidavit of Mr. H. 0. Lynch, President 
of the Petitioner company, wherein he states in para-
graph 2: uMr. Caldwell stated that he would purchase 
the subject acreage of this action and a cased well in 
the Horseshoe Bend Block for $1.25 per acre and 
$3,250.00 for the UJell. He asked that Anschutz Drilling 
Company, Inc., draw 1~;p a co·ntract and mail it to him.'' 
( Italics ours) . 
Then again in paragraph 5 of Mr. Lynch's affi-
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davit, he states: "I advised Mr. Alloway that the check 
\Vas not acceptable because it was not certified as re-
quired by the contract. Mr. Alloway stated that he 
\\·ould get the check certified and return with it. I then 
authorized 1\lr. \\T. \ V. Wakefield, Vice President of 
.t\nschutz Drilling Company, Inc., to accept the check 
if it were properly certified. I then left the offices of 
Anschutz Drilling Company, Inc., and did not return 
the rest of the day of February 24, 1961." 
'l.,he facts clearly show as evidenced by testimony 
and affidavits filed by the petitioner that its offer had 
been accepted and that it tried to evade acceptance of 
payment. The affidavits further indicate that the peti-
tioner recognized the necessity of accepting payment by 
certified check if the same, could have been procured by 
nlr. Alloway, as Mr. Lynch so instructed Mr. \V ake-
field. 
POIN'f 3 
THERE IS Al\1PLE EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT THIS COURT'S FINDING 'f HAT 
THERE ''r AS AN O:F,FER TO SIGN AND DE-
LI\TER THE CONTRAC'l., BY APPELLANTS' 
AGENT. 
The record clearly shows that those representing 
the petitioner consider the offer as having been accepted. 
c·ounsel for petitioner continually refers to the contract 
as "alleged contract" and "proposed written contract." 
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The contract was reduced to writing and in fact intro-
duced in evidence. 
Petitioner also continues its effort to mislead this 
Court by stating that there was no evidence to indicate 
an acceptance of the terms of the contract by the appel-
lants. A review of the testimony and affidavits, which, 
it must be noted, were filed by the Petitioner, clearly 
indicate that the seller had considered that terms were 
agreed to by the parties and that acceptance had been 
made with nothing remaining but payment of the earnest 
money. 
POINT 4 
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE ON 
WHICH A FINDING COULD BE BASED 
THAT THE APPELLANTS OFFERED TO 
SIGN THE WRITTEN CON'TRACT AND PAY 
THE EARNEST MONEY BUT THEIR TEN-
DER WAS REFUSED. 
As set forth in appellants' Brief on Appeal, and 
also noted at page 8 of respondent's brief supporting 
its petition for rehearing, it appears clear from the testi-
mony of Mr. Alloway that he was ready, willing and 
able to sign the contract and his offer was refused. It 
should be also noted that on page 10 of respondent's 
brief on rehearing, the testimony of Mr. Alloway is 
clearly to the effect that he offered to deliver cash to 
the respondent but the same was refused. 
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POIN1, 5 
'fHERE \\r AS AN OI~.,FER TO '!,ENDER 
l~ASII '1,0 'l,IIE RESPONDENT -WHICH WAS 
REFUSED B\T 'l,HE PE'l,l'l,IONER. 
'l,he testin1ony of Mr. Alloway is clear that he told 
~lr. Lynch that he would sign the contract for the 
appellants. l\)unsel for petitioner continually refers to 
the contract as an ~~unsigned contract." Perhaps counsel 
has overlooked the fact that petitioner signed the con-
tract before it was mailed to appellants. 
The trial record, coupled with the affidavits filed 
by the employees· and officers of the respondent cor-
poration, aptly demonstrates that there was a meeting 
of the minds as between the parties. The offer to sell 
by the respondent had in fact been accepted by the 
appellants and there remained only payment of the 
earnest money. Appellants maintain that a time exten-
sion for payment was granted by the respondent. Even 
respondent admits that a time extension was orally 
granted for this payment. The only dispute between 
the parties at this poii1t is the amount of time extended 
to the appellants in which to deliver the earnest money 
to the respondent. This is an issue of fact, to be deter-
mined by a jury, and this Honorable Court has so held 
in its opinion. Appellants will not belabor the point by 
repetitious argument on issues already fully decided 
by this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the petition for 
rehearing should be denied, as there is nothing presented 
by petitioner to justify a rehearing under the decisions 
of this Court. In re McKnight, 4 Utah 237, 9 P 299; 
Brown vs. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 9 Pac. 573, 11 Pac. 
512; Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. ROBERT BAYLE and 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR of 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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